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Abstract
We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers’
private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability,
the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project’s
observable and reported characteristics. When all reported qualities exceed their own
project-specific thresholds, the selected set only depends on observable characteristics,
not reported qualities. Each threshold is related to (i) the outside option level at
which the cost and benefit of eliciting information on the project cancel out and (ii)
the optimal value of selecting one among infinitely many ex ante identical projects.
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Many individuals, firms and government agencies face situations in which they need to
choose between a number of projects. Often, when making this choice the decision maker
(from now on “the firm”) is not fully informed and needs to rely on better informed agents
whose interests are not aligned with the firm’s. Our paper studies the firm’s project selec-
tion problem under asymmetric information. For example, a firm, or a government agency,
deciding which R&D projects to pursue, from projects proposed by managers working for
the firm; or a corporate board deciding which capital investment project to finance.
Projects can be risky, the likelihood of success (or the net expected return) might not
be known to the decision maker who is not su¢ciently familiar with the technical details.
Project managers hold private information about the quality of their projects, and typically
prefer that their own project be selected. Hence, their interests are not perfectly aligned with
those of the decision maker, and an agency problem arises. As Paul Sharpe (vice president
at SmithKline Beecham) and Tom Keelin (1998) described (page 45):
Major resource-allocation decisions are never easy. For a pharmaceuticals
company like SB [SmithKline Beecham], the problem is this: How do you make
good decisions in a high-risk, technically complex business when the information
you need to make those decisions comes largely from the project champions who
are competing against one another for resources?
In our model, a firm can only choose to pursue a limited number of projects (up to
m projects) from a given selection of (n  m) projects. Each project, if selected, would
yield some return to the firm. Projects of higher quality yield higher returns. There is a
fixed set of projects to choose from and the firm knows the distribution of qualities for each
project. Managers have private information about the quality of their project. For example,
a manager might know the probability of success of his project. A project manager enjoys
a private benefit if his own project is selected, and competes with other managers to be
financed. Hence, unless given the right incentives, a project manager might overstate the
quality of his project. It is costly for the firm to elicit information on project quality.
We take a mechanism design approach and look for an optimal mechanism. A direct
mechanism consists of a project selection rule and a transfer scheme (which depend on
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reported project qualities). Transfers are restricted to be nonnegative — a limited liability
constraint. This constraint distinguishes our problem from the classic design of an optimal
auction, where transfers are bounded by an individual rationality constraint. It is appropriate
in contexts where the firm cannot take away money from project managers, or when managers
are entitled to some sort of base salary, as may be the case within a firm.
Regarding limited liability, the following remark is in order. The limited liability con-
straint does not lead to interesting and new solutions in all problems. For example, if the
firm only cares about (minimizing) transfers, the solution is trivial. It should select projects
randomly and never compensate any manager. Or if the firm only cares about selecting a
good project, it should use a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The constraint is theoret-
ically interesting in the case where the firm cares both about selecting a good project and
about not spending too much on transfers, as is the case in our model.
We focus on mechanisms that only depend on reported project qualities and not on the
realized outcome of the selected projects. Such schemes may be appealing for R&D projects
that take a long time to be completed. For example, based on an interview of Merck’s CFO
Judy Lewent, Nicholas (1994) states that it takes about 10 years to bring a drug to market,
and once there, 70 percent of the products fail to return the cost of capital. It may also
be that the outcome of the project is only observable by the firm (and not by the project
managers or by a third party). This would be the case, for example, if the project is part of
a bigger scheme. Moreover, in some cases, for example in basic research projects, verifying
success might prove di¢cult. We also characterize the optimal mechanism when transfers
can be contingent on the realization of project selection and returns. We show that in
general mechanisms that allow such state dependent transfers can yield higher profits than
the simple mechanisms we discussed earlier. But, when private benefits of project managers
do not depend on project quality, the firm cannot improve its profits by making transfers
state dependent.
If the firm knew the projects’ qualities, the optimum would be to choose the m highest
quality projects. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the optimal mechanism
is such that sometimes the firm selects inferior projects. When project managers are ex-ante
identical, the optimal project selection rule involves a cuto§ quality such that if at most
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m project managers report a quality above the cuto§, the highest quality projects would
be selected. But if more project managers report high quality, the firm’s allocation rule
randomizes between those projects whose quality exceeds the cuto§. Hence, suboptimal
projects may be selected. When projects are ex-ante asymmetric, the ine¢ciency of the
optimal mechanism takes a more subtle form. For any given realized qualities of the other
projects, the probability that any particular project is selected is constant with respect to its
own quality when it is higher than some predetermined project-specific quality cuto§. Each
project’s quality cuto§ only depends on the project’s own observable characteristics.
Intuitively, the firm faces a trade-o§ between choosing the most promising project, and
saving on costs of eliciting information. When project managers’ private benefits from being
selected are very high, the cost of eliciting information may be too high, and the optimal
mechanism would be to choose a project independent of reported quality. A mechanism that
always chooses a fully e¢cient allocation is only optimal if project managers have no private
benefits (or if information is complete). Between these two extremes, there is a subset of the
project quality space (one with multiple promising projects) over which the firm’s selection
is independent of the quality of projects in that range. Within this region, the marginal cost
of eliciting additional quality information exceeds the marginal value of this information.
The optimal mechanism involves transfers that help the firm to elicit information. Man-
agers of projects that were not selected may get transfers that compensate them for truthfully
reporting lower quality. While rewarding a manager of a project that is not selected may
seem surprising at first, such mechanism can be important for providing incentives and can
be implemented in practice. Rewards for nonselected projects may be monetary or of other
nature. For example, within an organization, an R&D project manager that was not selected
may be transferred to a (possibly better paid, more prestigious or more secure) position in-
volving administrative duties.
While our paper’s main motivation is project selection, our model may also be applicable
to other situations. For example, the model can also capture the problem of a constrained
employer who needs to decide who should retire. The employees (“project managers”) benefit
from continuing to work. Their benefits are positively correlated with their productivity,
and some aspects of it is private information (such as the person’s health). Those who retire
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receive a monetary incentive to do so. Similarly, our model might capture the decision of
an employer who needs to decide whom among n employees to promote to m  n desirable
positions. In order to select the best candidates for these positions, the others may be o§ered
some compensation. Or consider parents who need to decide who of their kids to send to
college, those not sent to college may receive other monetary rewards. In all these examples,
it is crucial that the set of candidate projects and their quality distributions is exogenous
and fixed. Otherwise, the commitment to pay those not selected could attract bad projects
or reduce incentives of a project manager to either improve or acquire information about the
quality of his project.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section I we present the model; in
section II we consider the simple choice between a single project and an outside option;
the optimal mechanism for the general problem is derived in section III. In section IV we
present comparative statics results; in section V we discuss extensions of the model, the
formal derivations of these are available in an online appendix. In section VI we review
related literature; Section VII provides concluding remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
1 Model
A firm faces a choice between n projects i 2 N = {1, ..., n}. Being resource constrained, the
firm can choose to select up to m  n projects. Each project is represented by an agent (a
researcher or project manager). Project i’s true quality qi, which is its net expected return
for the firm, is drawn from a distribution Fi(qi) on [qi, qi]  R with a positive density function
fi(qi) > 0.We assume that qi are independent random variables. The quality of each project
is private information of its manager. In addition to the n projects, the firm has an outside
option that must be chosen if no other project is selected. The outside option is the best
alternative to selecting a project. It can be that the best alternative is not to select any
project which yields q = 0, or a project whose quality q 2 R is known to the firm. If not
selecting a project is possible then the outside option satisfies qo  0.
Project managers enjoy a private benefit bi(qi)  0 if their own project is selected, which
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represents an expected value of payo§s.1 Because we assume it is the firm who finances the
project, and not the managers, we find it reasonable to assume that benefits are nonnegative.
We also assume the private benefit is nondecreasing in the quality of the project b0i(qi)  0.
The benefit is assumed weakly increasing to captures the fact that managers may get a
higher benefit from being financed when their projects are more profitable. This can result
from a grater feeling of satisfaction, pride or reputation from working on a project that
is more likely to succeed.2 Higher quality projects can also be easier to implement. The
benefit functions are common knowledge. In our model, a project manager cannot benefit
from the project unless it is selected and financed. For example, a researcher working for a
pharmaceutical company is not likely to be able to develop a drug on her own, and may be
limited in her ability to secure other funding for a project (possibly because of “covenant
not to compete” agreements with the company she works for, or because the value of the
project is firm specific).
The firm decides which projects to select, and whether to o§er additional payments
to project managers. An allocation p = (p1, ..., pn) is a vector of probabilities, with pi
representing project i’s probability to be selected. A transfers vector t = (t1, ..., tn) indicates
how much money each manager receives from the firm. The firm cannot take money from
the managers, i.e. managers have limited liability, t  0. In a direct mechanism, each project
manager reports her quality and the firm selects projects and transfers money to managers
depending on the reports. Thus, a direct mechanism is a function q 7! (p (q) , t (q)) .3
In the game played, the firm first chooses and commits to a direct mechanism. The
managers of the n projects simultaneously report to the firm their projects’ qualities and the
allocation p (q) and transfers t (q) are realized. We look for a dominant-strategy incentive
1When project quality represents the probability of success of a binary random variable, we can write
b(qi) = qib
s
i + (1  qi)bfi where bsi is the private benefit in case the project succeeds and bfi is the private
benefit in case it fails. It is natural to assume in this example that bfi < b
s
i .
2Stern (2003) found, using survey data on job o§ers made to PhD biologists, that o§ers which contained
science-oriented provisions, were associated with lower monetary compensation and starting wages. Such
result lends support to the intuitive assumption that project managers enjoy private benefits from having
their own projects financed.
3In section V, we also consider more general mechanisms with transfers that depend on observed realized
returns of selected projects, when the quality of a project is its expected return.
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compatible mechanism. The firm’s objective is to maximize its expected profits:
max
{pi(q),ti(q)}i
(
Eq
"
nX
i=1
[(qi  q) pi(q) ti(q)]
#)
(1)
subject to
feasibility :
nX
i=1
pi(q)  m and 0  pj(q)  1 for all q and j; (2)
limited liability (LLi) : ti(q)  0 for all i and for all q; (3)
and the following incentive compatibility constraints: for all q, for all i, and for all q0i,
(ICi) : pi(q)bi(qi) + ti(q)  pi(q0i,qi)bi(qi) + ti(q0i,qi), (4)
where q = (q1, ..., qn), with its j-th component being project j’s quality, and (q0i,qi) equals
q everywhere excepts in its i-th coordinate which is replaced with q0i.
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Finally, we introduce notation that would be helpful in later analyses. For any quality
of project i, qi, let
Gi (qi) = qi + bi(qi) + b
0
i(qi)
Fi (qi)
fi(qi)
(5)
be the virtual return that is obtained from selecting project i. Throughout the paper, we
assume that this function is strictly increasing. Note that the sum of the first two terms
is necessarily strictly increasing. The function is monotone as long as the derivative of the
third term is not too negative. This holds true for a wide range of parametric assump-
tions for example, if bi(qi) is convex (or linear) in qi and the reverse hazard fi(qi)/Fi (qi) is
nonincreasing. The latter holds, for nearly all the commonly used distributions (see Moor
1985). Additionally, the function Gi (qi) is strictly increasing for any distribution when bi(qi)
is constant.
4The constraint (4) is a dominant-strategy incentive compatibility condition, as opposed to a Bayesian
incentive compatibility constraint often used. In an online appendix we show that the optimal mechanism
we find is also optimal among Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. This result is related to Manelli
and Vincent (2010) although we could not directly apply their findings due to the presence of the limited
liability constraint.
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2 One Project
In this section we derive the optimal mechanism when the firm faces the choice between
selecting a unique project i or the outside option. The analysis of this case, wherem = n = 1,
will facilitate the analysis of the general problem in section IV. The unique project is denoted
by i rather than 1 to avoid repetitions in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Threshold mechanisms
A natural family of direct mechanisms to consider is to select the project whenever its
reported quality exceeds a given threshold, and choose the outside option otherwise.
Definition 1 A threshold mechanism a, for a 2 qi, qi is defined by:
pi (qi) =
8<: 1 if qi  a,0 if qi < a. and ti (qi) =
8<: 0 if qi  a,bi (a) if qi < a.
The outside option is selected with probability 1 pi (qi) .
The transfers make truthful reports incentive compatible. There is no need to give a
transfer to the manager whose project is selected. However, whenever the project is not
selected, the manager is compensated an amount equal to bi (a). By falsely reporting a
quality high enough to be selected, the manager could get at most bi (qi)  bi (a) , so there
is no incentive to overstate the quality. In a threshold mechanism with a = qi, the project is
always selected.
Always selecting the outside option, without transfers, is not a threshold mechanism.5
We refer to this mechanism as the outside option mechanism. In the remainder of the section,
we look for the optimal mechanism among all threshold mechanisms and the outside option
mechanism. In section III, we establish that this restriction is without loss of generality.
In a threshold mechanism a, when the project quality is qi < a, the firm selects the outside
option and pays bi(a) to the project manager. In this range, the firm’s payo§ is constant,
5If we redefine transfers so that pi (qi) = 1 for qi > a, there is a threshold mechanism that always selects
the outside option. However, by definition 1, it would be accompanied by positive transfers. The outside
mechanism defined here involves no transfers.
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q  bi(a). When the project quality is qi  a the project is selected and no transfers are
given. In this range, the firm’s payo§ is qi. Thus, the expected profit for the firm under the
threshold mechanism a and the outside option q equals
V (a, q) = (q  bi(a))F (a) +
Z qi
a
qifi (qi) dqi.
Substituting bi(a)F (a) = bi (qi)
Z qi
a
[bi (qi) fi (qi) + b
0
i (qi)F (qi)] dqi we obtain
V (a, q) = qF (a) +
Z qi
a
[bi (qi) fi (qi) + b
0
i (qi)F (qi)] dqi  bi (qi) +
Z qi
a
qifi (qi) dqi.
Rearranging and using the definition of the virtual return Gi (·) in (5) we obtain
V (a, q) =
Z qi
a
Gi (qi) fi (qi) dqi  bi (qi) + qF (a) . (6)
We look for the quality threshold ai (q
) that maximizes this value for a given q. Because
Gi (·) is increasing, the firm’s profit V (·, ·) is single-peaked in a. In an interior solution,
@V
@a
(a, q) = Gi (a) fi (a) + qfi (a) = 0,
which implies Gi (ai (q
)) = q. That is, the profit V (a, q) is maximized at a threshold
quality a that equalizes the virtual return Gi (a) with the quality of the outside option q.
For low values of the outside option, q < Gi

qi

, @V
@a
(a, q) < 0 for all a, which implies that
the optimal threshold is qi. Similarly for high values of the outside option, q > Gi (qi) the
optimal threshold is qi. Thus,
ai (q
) =
8>>><>>>:
qi if q > Gi (qi) ,
G1i (q
) if q 2 Gi qi , Gi (qi) ,
qi if q < Gi

qi

.
(7)
From these expressions, we see that the optimal threshold ai (q
) is a nondecreasing
function of the outside option q, intuitively, the principal will be more selective when her
outside option is better. We also note that if the value of the outside option is at least as
large as the worse project q  qi then the threshold is smaller than or equal to the outside
option ai (q
)  q. This means that some projects may be selected even if their reported
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return is lower than that of the outside option. The reason for this is that a wider range of
selection reduces the need to o§er transfers.
Let the value of the optimal threshold mechanism to the firm, given q be:
V  (q) = max
a
V (a, q) = V (ai (q
) , q) . (8)
2.2 Best threshold mechanism vs. the outside option mechanism
The outside option mechanism is not a threshold mechanism. Therefore, we still need to
compare the value of the optimal threshold mechanism with the outside option q. For any
project i (characterized by a distribution of project qualities and a private benefit function)
we find the value of the outside option gi that makes the firm indi§erent between the best
threshold mechanism and the outside option mechanism. We refer to this value of the outside
option as the cap. If the outside option exceeds the cap gi , then the firm should stick to the
outside option mechanism — always select the outside option and never provide transfers.
If the outside option is lower than the cap, then the firm should use the optimal threshold
mechanism which sometimes selects the project and other times selects the outside option.
The cap gi only depends on project i’s observable characteristics. It will play an important
role in the analysis of the general case in section IV.
Lemma 1 There exists a quality gi 2 [E [qi] , Gi (qi)] , unique in R, such that
V  (gi ) gi = 0. (9)
The threshold mechanism can be thought of as if the firm o§ers the candidate a choice
between being selected for the project and being paid a fixed monetary amount. The optimal
monetary amount that the firm should o§er and the expected transfer to the candidate are
nondecreasing functions of the quality of the outside option. Essentially, the firm buys
information on the quality of the project. The better the outside option, the higher the
price the firm must pay to elicit this information. If the quality of the outside option is high
enough (exceeds the cap gi ), it is better to chose the outside option without eliciting any
information.
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2.3 Firm’s optimal profit
We now derive a simple expression of the firm’s optimal profit. Consider first the case
q  gi , so that the optimal threshold mechanism dominates the outside option mechanism.
Using (8) at q and gi and taking the di§erence between the two expressions, we obtain
V  (q) V  (gi ) =
Z ai (gi )
ai (q)
Gi (qi) fi (qi) dqi + q
F (ai (q
)) gi F (ai (gi )) .
Using V  (gi ) = g

i and rearranging terms,
V  (q) = qF (ai (q
)) +
Z ai (gi )
ai (q)
Gi (qi) fi (qi) dqi + g

i (1 F (ai (gi )))
=
Z ai (q)
qi
qfi (qi) dqi +
Z ai (gi )
ai (q)
Gi (qi) fi (qi) dqi +
Z qi
ai (gi )
gi fi (qi) dqi
= E (max {min {Gi (qi) , gi } , q}) .
The third equality is true because q  Gi (qi) if and only if ai (q)  qi and because
gi  Gi (qi) if and only if ai (gi )  qi.
Let the virtual quality of the project be denoted by
xi = min {Gi (qi) , gi } . (10)
The project is selected if its virtual quality exceeds the outside option and otherwise the
outside option is chosen. Hence
V  (q) = E (max {xi, q}) . (11)
In the case where the outside option is better than the optimal threshold mechanism,
i.e. q  gi , the profit of the firm at the optimal mechanism is q, which also equals the
expression (11). Therefore, the expression (11) describes the optimal profit of the firm for
any outside option q.
An implication of these derivations is that there are projects for which the decision maker
never elicits information from the manager regardless what the outside option is, and for this
reason, the manager will also never receive any compensation. For such project the virtual
quality is constant xi = gi = E (qi) for all qi and the project will be selected if an only if its
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expected value E (qi) exceeds the outside option q. We provide a necessary and su¢cient
condition for the manager’s report to be ignored in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A project’s virtual quality is constant and equals gi = E (qi) if and only if
fi (·) and bi (·) satisfy the inequality bi

qi
  E (qi) qi.
According to the condition in proposition 1, the decision maker is more likely to ignore
the manager’s reports when the manager has a lot to benefit even from the lowest quality
project, or when the distribution of project qualities exhibits less uncertainty in a mean
preserving spread order. In other words, transfers are used to elicit information when the
cost (the need to compensate) is not too high, and the benefit (avoiding the need to finance
low quality projects) is high.
In the next section we use the derivations we made for the single project case to solve
the problem of choosing m out of n projects. When multiple projects are available, for each
project we define the virtual quality as in (10). We generalize the expression in (11) for the
optimal value and suggest a candidate optimal mechanism — the highest m virtual quality
projects should be selected when these exceed the outside option. Our proof for the general
case confirms that the optimal threshold mechanism we derived for the single project case is
optimal among all feasible direct mechanisms.
3 Optimal Mechanisms in the General Case
We search for a profit maximizing incentive compatible mechanism with a feasible project
selection rule and transfers that satisfy the limited liability constraint. For simplicity, and
without loss of generality, we will assume that the outside option has quality q = 0.
3.1 Optimal mechanisms
If information was symmetric, the firm would have always selected the m highest quality
projects (or as many that are better than the outside option). However, the manager’s
private information on project qualities is costly for the firm to elicit. Because each project
manager benefits if his project is selected, absent compensation, selecting the highest quality
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projects creates an incentive for managers to overstate the quality of their projects. In any
incentive compatible mechanism the firm needs to compensate project managers for truth
telling. Thus, when choosing projects the firm takes into account not only the quality of
projects but also the cost of eliciting information. This is done by choosing the m highest
virtual quality projects instead of simply the highest m quality projects.
Given a vector of real numbers x = (x1, ..., xn+m) , let

x(1), ..., x(n+m)

denote the order
statistics of x, i.e. the vector obtained by sorting the coordinates of x in a nonincreasing
order, so that x(1)  ...  x(n+m). Let Sm (x1, ..., xn+m) be the sum of the first m coordinates
of the order statistics vector, i.e. the sum of the m highest coordinates of x.
The firm needs to choose at most m out of n projects, it obtains its outside option of
q = 0 for a project not selected. Let us represent its problem as a choice of exactly m
projects from the set of n+m project that contains the original n projects and in addition
m projects that have a known quality q = 0. For any (n-dimensional) vector of project
qualities q we define an (n+m)-dimensional vector of virtual project qualities
x(q) =
0@min {G1 (q1) , g1} , ...,min {Gn (qn) , gn} , 0, ..., 0| {z }
m times
1A . (12)
where Gi and gi are defined in (5) and (9). The first n coordinates represent the virtual
qualities of the n projects as we derived for the single project case in (10) in section III. The
last m coordinates represent the outside option which can replace each of the m selections.
For the vector of virtual qualities x(q) in (12) x(m)(q) is its m-th highest coordinate.
There may be multiple projects with this virtual quality. The allocation we propose selects
with probability 1 any project that has a virtual quality which is strictly higher than them-th
highest virtual quality (there are less thanm such projects). For the remaining selections, the
mechanism chooses with equal probabilities projects from the set of (one or more) projects
that have the m-th highest virtual quality. Other projects are not selected.
pi (q) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if xi (q) > x(m) (q)
m|i2{i2N : xi(q)>x(m)(q)}|
|{i2N : xi(q)=x(m)(q)}| if xi (q) = x(m) (q)
0 if xi (q) < x(m) (q)
. (13)
With this allocation, x(m)(q) is the lowest virtual quality that is selected with a positive
probability. To find transfers that ensure this allocation is incentive compatible we first
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find the quality of project i such that G(qmi ) yields the virtual quality x(m)(q) (when it
exists). For each i 2 N , let qmi = ai

x(m)(q)

. For the allocation rule pi (q) to be incentive
compatible transfers are as follows
ti (q) = (pi (qi,qi) pi (q)) bi(qmi ). (14)
With these transfers, a project that is selected with probability pi = 1 receives no transfer
ti = 0. For a project selected with probability pi = 0, the transfer equals the highest expected
benefit from misreporting. A manager with quality lower but arbitrarily close to qmi is not
selected and his transfer should be arbitrarily close to pi (qi,qi) bi(qmi ), because he can
misreport qi. Hence, pi (qi,qi) bi(qmi ) must be the transfer of any manager with pi = 0 who
could report a quality arbitrarily close to qmi . A manager with pi 2 (0, 1) receives a positive
transfer only if pi (qi,qi) = 1.
The following theorem generalizes the results obtained for the case m = n = 1 in section
III to the general case n  m  1. Let Vm denote the optimal profit for the firm that can
select up to m projects. The optimal profit for the firm is the expected value of the sum of
the highest m virtual qualities out of the n+m available virtual qualities.
Theorem 1 The project selection mechanism defined by the allocation rule (13) and the
transfers (14) solves the problem stated in (1)-(4). It gives the firm the optimal profit
Vm = Eq [Sm (x(q))] . (15)
In the following Corollary we describe the allocation rule of the optimal mechanism when
all projects are ex-ante symmetric.
Corollary 1 In the symmetric problem, g1 = ... = g

n := g
. (i) If all projects have negative
virtual qualities xi = min {Gi (qi) , g} < 0, then the outside option is selected; (ii) If there are
at least m projects in the sample such that G (qi)  g  0, then in an optimal mechanism,
m of these projects are selected at random; (iii) Otherwise, the m (or less) projects satisfying
G (qi)  0 whose qualities rank among the m highest are selected.
In the symmetric case, when su¢ciently many projects have a quality that exceeds a
threshold quality, selection among these top candidates is random, and therefore a lower
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quality project can be selected over a higher quality one. The mechanism we propose in
Theorem 1 is essentially the only symmetric optimal mechanism, except in the boundary
case where g = 0. However, even in the generic case (g 6= 0), nonsymmetric generalizations
of the proposed mechanism, which assign fixed (not necessarily equal) selection probabilities
to agents whose virtual qualities equal the m-th highest virtual quality, are also optimal.
The results for the symmetric case are illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that the projects are ex-ante symmetric, and that the quality is uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1] and that the private benefit is a constant b 2 (0, 0.5) . In the
optimal mechanism (see Figure 1), when at least one project manager reports a quality which
is lower than the cuto§ a = 1p2b, the highest quality project is selected. However, in the
top region, where q1, q2  a, the two projects are selected with equal probabilities pi = 0.5.
Hence, a less e¢cient project may be selected. Figure 1a illustrates the project selection
probabilities. Transfers are shown in figure 1b. Compensation for the manager whose project
was not selected is just enough to ensure incentive compatibility. Hence, it equals zero if this
manager’s reported quality was higher than a, otherwise, it equals b if the selected project
had a quality below a and 0.5b if it exceeded a.
[Figure 1]
3.2 Optimal vs. constant mechanisms
In section II, we showed that when there is only one project to evaluate against the outside
option, it is sometimes optimal not to elicit any information from its manager. We ask
here a similar question, when there are several candidate projects. We consider the family
of simpler mechanisms that do not attempt to elicit information from managers. In such
mechanisms the allocation does not depend on reported qualities and no transfers are made
to the managers. We refer to these mechanisms as constant mechanisms. The optimal
mechanism we derived before clearly generates at least as high a profit to the firm as any
constant mechanism (constant mechanisms are a subset of all mechanisms we considered).
Following Theorem 1, we ask, when is the optimal mechanism strictly better than the best
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constant mechanism. We first provide conditions for a mechanism to be optimal among all
constant mechanisms.
Lemma 2 For anyM  N with |M|  m, the constant mechanism that selects the subset
of projectsM is optimal among all constant mechanisms if and only if
max

max
j2N\M
E [qj] , 0

 min
i2M
E [qi]
and
|M| < m =) max
j2N\M
E [qj]  0.
The first condition states that the least attractive project that is selected is better than
the best project that is not selected and also better than the outside option (zero return).
The second condition states that if less than them projects are selected, the best project that
is not selected is less preferred than the outside option. From Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we
now derive conditions under which a constant mechanism is optimal among all mechanisms.
For the best constant mechanismM to coincide with the optimal mechanism, the allo-
cations of the two mechanisms must coincide for any realization of q. This is equivalent to
say that the virtual quality of any project i inM must be greater than the virtual quality of
any project j outside ofM, and also greater than the outside option 0, for any realization
of q. For this condition to hold it is su¢cient (and clearly also necessary) that it holds for
the realization of q which are worst for projects in M and at the same time, are best for
projects not inM. In the worst case scenario for a project i inM, its virtual quality either
equals qi+ bi

qi

, if for project i, bi

qi

+ qi  E (qi) or else it equals E (qi). In the best case
scenario for a project j outside of themM, its virtual quality equals gj . In the case where
M contains less than m projects, optimality among all mechanisms also requires that in the
best realization for any project j outside ofM, its virtual quality gj is also smaller than the
outside option 0. We summarize these conditions in the following result.
Corollary 2 An optimal constant mechanism that selects a subset of projectsM is optimal
among all mechanisms if and only if
max

max
j2N\M

gj

, 0

 min
i2M
min

E [qi] , qi + bi

qi

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and
|M| < m =) max
j2N\M
gj  0.
When the conditions of the corollary are not satisfied for any subset M, the optimal
mechanism is not a constant one and involves eliciting private information through transfers.
Interestingly, one can construct examples where the optimal mechanism improves upon the
outside option mechanism, even though the outside option mechanism happens to be the
optimal constant mechanism. In such situations, using the optimal mechanism enables the
firm to select a project, although it wouldn’t have selected any if only constant (independent
of reported qualities) mechanisms were allowed. The following result provides the necessary
and su¢cient conditions, as a direct implication of Corollary 2.
Corollary 3 The outside option is the best constant mechanism and is inferior to the opti-
mal mechanism if and only if for all j in N , E (qj)  0 and for some i in N , gi > 0.
The first inequality ensures that the outside option mechanism is the best constant mech-
anism. The second inequality ensures that it is inferior to the optimal mechanism. These
conditions are likely to be satisfied if all projects have a negative expected quality, but at
least one of the candidate projects has a highly uncertain quality relative to its manager
willingness to be selected.6
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we provide comparative statics results on the number of projects, the private
benefit function and the distribution of quality.
4.1 The number of projects
We have computed the optimal project selection mechanism for a fixed number of projects
n. The caps gi , defined in (9), that we use to define the optimal mechanism only depends on
the characteristics of project i, not on other projects’ characteristics, nor on the number of
6See the comparative statics on mean preserving spreads at the end of section 5.
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candidate projects. However, the profit of the firm does depend on the number of available
projects to choose from. We first observe that when the set of projects the firm can select
from expands, for a fixed m, profit (weakly) increases. To see this, consider a firm that
originally faced selection between n projects now faces selection between these same projects
and one additional n + 1-th project. A mechanism that treats the first n projects just like
when these where the only projects and ignores the last project, tn+1(q) = pn+1(q) = 0 for
all q, is feasible and achieves the same profit as before. Hence, with the optimal mechanism
profit is at least as high.
In the symmetric case and for a fixed m, one can show that the optimal expected profit
(15) is concave in n.7 In the general case, while profit increases as the set of available projects
expands, as long as project quality is bounded, so is the expected profit. In the following
proposition we derive a limit result. Suppose that the set of projects is randomly chosen
from some population. The distribution of the caps gi defined in (9) determines the profit
per project in the limit as the number of projects to choose from goes to infinity.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose that the vectors (gi , qi) of caps and project qualities are inde-
pendently and identically drawn from a continuous distribution.8 Let
h
gi , g

i
i
be the support
of the marginal distribution of gi . Suppose that the conditional cdf F (· | gi ) are such that
any distributions conditional on a higher value of gi first order stochastically dominates a
distributions conditional on a lower gi . Then for a fixed m, in the limit where n goes to
infinity, the profit of the firm at the optimal mechanism converges in probability to mgi .
(ii) In the symmetric case, where all thresholds equal g, the profit of the firm as the
number of projects increases to infinity converges in probability to mg.
The second part of this proposition provides an asymptotic interpretation of the threshold
gi of a project i. It is the limit of the per selected project return when the number of available
7This is because the expected value of each of the k-th order-statistics for k = 1, ...,m of an n + m
dimensional i.i.d. random vector is concave in n. The firm’s profit is the sum of the first m order-statics of
the vector of virtual qualities.
8Note that the assumption require independence across projects, but a project i’s quality and the cap
associated with that project may be dependent.
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projects approaches infinity and all candidate projects are ex-ante identical to project i, i.e.
they all have the same threshold gi .
The number of projects available to a firm to choose from is likely however to be finite.
The number of skilled researchers in the relevant technology might be limited. It is likely
costly to increase the pool of potential projects identifying candidates and the relevant
distribution from which their quality is drawn. There can also be administrative costs to
consider more projects. In the following example we derive the profit from choosing one
project (m = 1) as a function of the number of projects n in the symmetric model when
project qualities are uniformly distributed and benefits are constant. This profit is increasing
and concave in n. Hence accounting for some convex cost c(n) there would be a unique
optimal finite number of projects.
Example 2 Suppose b (qi) = b < 0.5 for all qi and that the distribution is uniform on [0, 1] .
The firm faces a choice of m = 1 out of n projects. Then,
gi = 1
p
2b+ b. (16)
a  a (gi ) = 1
p
2b (17)
In the optimal mechanism, if at most one project has a quality that exceeds 1  p2b, the
highest quality project would be selected. If two or more project qualities exceed this cuto§,
one project among the projects with a quality higher than 1p2b would be selected at random.
The expected profit for the firm is
V (n) =
1
2
(1 + a2) a
n+1
n+ 1
. (18)
The profit V (n) is increasing and concave in the number of projects n. As the number of
projects approaches infinity, V (n)! 0.5(1 + a2) = 1p2b+ b = gi .
4.2 Changes in private benefits
We study here the e§ect on the optimal mechanism of changes in the benefit functions bi.
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4.2.1 Asymmetric benefits
In the general asymmetric case, let i be an arbitrary project. Consider a change in project i0s
benefit function from bi (·) to another benefit function ebi (·) for project i, such that ebi (qi) <
bi (qi) for all qi, but no other change in the fundamentals of the model. How does this change
a§ect the optimal mechanism and profit?
Let V and eV respectively denote the profit of the firm under the benefit functions bi (·)
and ebi (·) . We will show that V  eV . To see this, observe that under the benefit function
bi (·) , the value V is achieved by the optimal mechanism defined by (13) and (14). Under the
benefit function ebi (·) , this same allocation p (·) defined by (13) is implemented, provided
that transfers (14) are replace by transfers such that
eti (q) = (pi (bq,qi) pi (q))ebi(qmi ).
This mechanism is feasible under the benefit function ebi (·) , i.e. it satisfies the constraints
(2), (3) and (4). Since ebi (qi) < bi (qi) for all qi, this mechanism gives the firm a higher profit
than the initial one. This mechanism may not be optimal under the benefit function ebi (·) ,
but the optimal expected profit of the firm is at least the profit achieved by this mechanism.
Thus, the firm’s optimal profit is higher under ebi (·) than under bi (·) , which shows that a
decrease of the benefit function raises the firm’s optimal profit.
We now study the e§ect of bi on the cap gi for project i. Suppose that manager i’s
private benefit depends on a real parameter  so that the benefit function is bi (qi,) which
is increasing in qi and in . From the analysis in section III, we know that the cap gi is
determined by the following equation.
max
a

gi Fi (a) bi(a,)Fi (a) +
Z qi
a
qifi (qi) dqi

 gi = 0.
Abusing notations, let ai  ai (gi ,) . By implicit di§erentiation,
dgi
d
=  Fi (a

i )
(1 Fi (ai ))
@bi(a

i ,)
@
< 0.
Thus, increasing  decreases the cap gi for project i.
What is the e§ect of increasing  on the quality threshold ai ? Since this function is
increasing in gi , the indirect e§ect of increasing  is to decrease a

i , via g

i . However, the
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direct e§ect is unclear as it also depends on how the shift changes the slope of bi. One can
sign this direct e§ect as well, under the additional assumption that increasing  (weakly)
increases both the private benefit bi and its slope @bi/@qi. Notice that this includes the case
of a vertical shift of the form bi (qi,) = bi (qi) + . Under these assumptions, the threshold
ai is decreasing in the shift .
Fixing the other project’s reported qualities qi, the e§ect of an increase in  (and
thus in bi (·)) on the set of qualities qi at which project i is selected (and thus on the
selection probability of project i) is nonmonotonic. It first enlarges it, but at some point
may discontinuously reduce it to the empty set. To see this, consider the case where project
i is the unique candidate project evaluated only against an outside option q, as in section
III. An increase in  decreases the optimal quality threshold ai (q
) above which project i
is selected, and therefore increases the selection probability of project i. But the value of
the optimal threshold mechanism also decreases and at some point becomes inferior to the
outside option mechanism. When this occurs, the selection probability of project i jumps
down to zero.
The above results also enable us to compare caps and thresholds in an asymmetric prob-
lem. If two project have the same quality distributions, but one has a higher private benefit
bi (·) than the other, it has a lower cap gi . If in addition it also has a higher benefit slope
@bi/@qi, it then also has a lower threshold ai . These results are illustrated in the following
example.
Example 3 Let n = 2 and m = 1. Consider the optimal mechanism when qualities are
drawn from the same distribution F1(.) = F2 (.); private benefits are constant b2 > b1  0;
also assume E(q) > q
i
+ bi so that ai > qi. Then g

1  g2 and a1 > a2. We observe some
interesting properties of the optimal mechanism in this example. When both qualities exceed
their corresponding cuto§s qi  ai, project 1, belonging to the manager whose private benefit
is lower, is selected. This would give project manager 2 (who is most eager to be selected) less
of an incentive to overstate his success probability. Therefore, there is a range of qualities
for which project 1 is selected even though it has a lower quality. There is also a range
of probabilities where project 2 has a lower quality than project 1 yet project 2 is selected.
This will occur in the range where both probabilities are below their corresponding cuto§s,
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qi < a

i , and (q1, q2) lies below the 45
o but above the G1 (q1) = G2 (q2) curve (which is given
by q2 = q1  (b2  b1)). In this case project 2 has a lower quality but a higher virtual quality
than project 1 (q2 < q1 < q2 + b2  b1) and it is selected despite the fact that project 1 has a
higher quality.
4.2.2 Symmetric benefits
In the symmetric case, consider an upward shift on the common private benefit b (·) , while
the distribution F (·) is held constant. Let the private benefit of all managers be b (qi,)
which is increasing in qi and in . From the analysis of the asymmetric case, increasing 
decreases both the common cap gi and the optimal expected profit of the firm. If in addition
@b/@qi is also increasing in , then increasing  also decreases the common quality threshold
a. This results in a larger pooling region at the top. The set of quality profiles at which the
highest quality project is not necessarily selected grows.
4.3 Changes in the distribution
One can study the e§ects of a first-order stochastic-dominant shift of the distribution Fi (·) for
an arbitrary project i, while holding all other parameters constant. Using similar arguments
as in the previous subsection, one can show that such a shift increases the expected profit of
the firm and project i’s cap gi . The e§ect of the shift on the quality threshold a

i  ai (gi )
is ambiguous, but under the additional assumption that bi (·) is a constant, one can show
that the shift increases ai . Notice however that the probability Fi (a

i ) that the quality is
lower than ai can move in either direction, since a

i moves up but Fi (·) moves down. An
application of these results is given in the following example.
Example 4 Let n = 2 and m = 1. Consider the optimal mechanism when F1(.) first-order
stochastically dominates F2 (.) but private benefits are constant and equal b2 = b1 = b. Then
g1 > g

2 and a

1 > a

2. When both qualities exceed their corresponding cuto§s, the virtual
qualities are gi and so project 1 is selected.
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Similarly, one can study the e§ect of a mean preserving spread on the distribution Fi (·) for
an arbitrary project i, while holding all other parameters constant.9 Little can be said in this
case, if the benefit bi depends nontrivially on qi. If bi is constant, using again the same type
of arguments as in the previous subsection, and the fact that the function max {q  bi, qi} is
convex in qi for any fixed q, one can show that such a spread increases the expected profit of
the firm, project i’s cap gi and the quality threshold a

i  ai (gi ) . Here also, the probability
Fi (a

i ) that the quality is lower than a

i can move in either direction, since Fi (qi) moves up
or down depending on qi. An application of these results is given in the following example.
Example 5 Let n = 2 and m = 1. Consider the optimal mechanism when F1(.) is a mean
preserving spread of F2 (.) but private benefits are constant and equal b2 = b1 = b. Then
g1 > g

2 and a

1 > a

2. When both qualities exceed their corresponding cuto§s, the virtual
qualities are gi and so project 1 is selected.
5 Generalizations
In this section we informally describe directions in which our model can be generalized, and
how the optimal mechanism would change. We provide corresponding formal derivations
in an online appendix. We first allow transfers to be contingent on realization of project
selection and outcomes. We next consider agents that have interests that are at least partially
aligned with those of the firm. Finally we allow negative benefit functions so that some agents
do not want to be selected.
5.1 State contingent transfers
In the analyses in the previous sections we have considered mechanisms that only depend on
reported qualities — the only information available to the firm when it is making a selection.
In this section we ask whether the firm can do better if it were able to make transfers
contingent on the realized return of the projects that were selected. For example, if project
9Recall that eF is a mean-preserving spread of F if the two distributions have the same expected value
and for any concave function u (·) of qi, we have E eF [u (qi)]  EF [u (qi)] .
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quality represents the probability of success of the project, and the firm can observe ex-post
whether the selected project succeeded, then the transfer can depend on success. If state
dependent mechanisms are available, the firm would generally achieve a higher profit than
when transfers can only depend on reported probabilities.
To consider state contingent transfers we introduce a state space describing possible re-
alized returns of the financed projects. The project quality which is known to the managers
is the expected return of the project. We provide an upper bound on the value that the
firm can obtain when it can pay transfers contingent on the realization of both the project
stochastic allocation, and the selected projects’ outcomes. A state s = (M,R) indicates the
set of projects (if any) that were selectedM  N and the realization of the return of the
projects which were selected R 2 R|M|. A mechanism is a function (bq, s) 7! (p (bq) , t (bq, s)) .
We then write the constraint optimization problem, accounting for this larger space of mech-
anisms. We impose incentive constraints and the limited liability constraints which have to
hold state by state.
The solution method for this problem follows similar steps as in sections II and III. We
derive an upper bound for the optimal value, and then propose a mechanism that satisfies
the constraints and (here only approximately) achieves the upper bound.
The optimal mechanism with state dependent transfers is characterized by a similar
project selection rule as that with deterministic transfers. In particular, in the symmetric
case, project selection is ine¢cient in the region where several managers report project qual-
ities that exceed a cuto§. However, while with deterministic transfers the highest quality
projects are selected for sure outside this region, with state dependent transfers, the firm
could approach maximum profits if it allows low reported probability projects to be selected
with some small probability, and highly rewards a favorable outcome in the unlikely event
that the low quality project is selected. This can allow the firm to pay lower expected trans-
fers to managers who report low quality and obtain a higher profit than with deterministic
transfers. Interestingly, however, when private benefits are constant (b0i(qi) = 0) the optimal
mechanism with state dependent transfers is identical to that when transfers can only de-
pend on reported probabilities. Hence, in this special case, nothing is gained from allowing
the richer set of mechanisms.
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5.2 Agents with partially aligned interests
In some environments, an agent might have interests that are at least partially aligned with
those of the firm and so the agent might prefer some other agent’s project to be implemented
over his own, if the quality di§erence is high. In such situation, a manager enjoys some private
benefit not only when his own project is selected, but also when another manager’s project
is selected. It is natural to assume that the benefit that manager i receives increases with
the quality of the financed project. But for a given project quality, the manager’s payo§ is
higher if his own project is selected. In the extreme case where manager i’s benefit functions
are the same function whether his own project is implement or another manager’s project,
the agent prefers the highest quality project to be selected, regardless of whether it is his own
project. In such a case, the interests of the agents and the financing agency are perfectly
aligned. A mechanism that chooses the highest reported quality project and never o§ers
transfers would be optimal. However, when at least for some qualities qi, an agent enjoys
his own project being financed more than someone else’s project with the same quality, an
adverse selection problem remains.
In section C of the online appendix we formally derive the optimal mechanism for this
version of the model. We solve this model under the assumption that when another project’s
quality is not much higher, the benefit from being selected is higher than the benefit from
the other project being selected. The analysis and results are similar to those in the previous
sections. Any allocation implementable in the main model is implementable in the model
with partially aligned interests, with lower transfers. This is because when another agent
is selected, that serves as partial compensation to the nonselected agents. Thus, profits in
model with partially aligned interests are higher.
5.3 Agents that prefer not to be selected
In our model we have assumed that bi(qi) is positive so that agents always want to be selected.
We did not include an individual rationality constraint because it was implied by the limited
liability constraint. If the benefit function could take negative values for low project qualities,
then the individual rationality constraint would bind in a range of project qualities. Negative
25
benefit functions could arise for example when the agent su§ers a loss from a project that
fails, and the probability of success of the project is low. If the benefit functions are always
negative, then the individual rationality constraint implies limited liability. In this case, the
problem becomes similar to that described in Vincent and Manelli (1995).
Maintaining our assumption that benefit functions increase with project quality, we con-
sidered the case where bi(qi) is negative for low project qualities and positive for high qual-
ities. In this problem, the individual rationality constraint binds when agents have low
project qualities and the limited liability constraint binds when agents have high qualities.
To guarantee that the incentive constraints hold, transfers need to compensate managers
who want to be selected but are not selected, so that they would not overstate their proba-
bility of success; and transfers need to compensate managers who do not want to be selected
but are selected so that they would not understate the quality of their project to avoid being
selected. In section D of the online appendix we formally derive the optimal mechanism for
this version of the model.
6 Related Literature
Our work is related to a large body of literature on auctions and mechanism design. In terms
of our main application of interest, our work also relates to a literature on project selection.
The main problem we study is similar to Myerson’s (1981) optimal auction design, which
maximizes a seller’s utility. His problem is a linear program with incentive compatibility
and individual rationality (IR) constraints. One important di§erence between our problem
and Myerson’s is that we consider a limited liability (LL) constraint, which, in our model,
is stronger than individual rationality and therefore replaces it. We show how the optimal
mechanism changes when IR is replaced by LL.
As in Myerson (1981) our solution selects the projects (bidders) with the highest “virtual”
quality. The virtual quality for each player is a measure of the social value of selecting this
player, net of the costs of providing truth-telling incentives. Importantly, it is a function of
the type and commonly known characteristics of this particular player, but not of others.
The exact form of the function that transforms type (quality) into a virtual type in our
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model di§ers from Myerson’s in two ways. The first is that his virtual valuation distorts
the social value of selecting a player at the bottom, while our virtual quality distorts it at
the top. The reason for this is that while IR is binding for low types (who contemplate on
whether or not to participate), LL is binding for high types (who are never compensated).
The second, more interesting, di§erence is that in our model, each project has its own specific
quality threshold above which the virtual quality is constant. This interesting feature is not
observed in Myerson’s model and is the main consequence of replacing IR by LL. As a result,
when a project’s quality exceeds its threshold, the probability that it gets selected may be
constant and less than one, which never occurs in Myerson’s model.
La§ont and Robert (1996) and Maskin (2000) study optimal auctions under positive
commonly-known budget constraints and IR. La§ont and Robert (1996) study revenue max-
imization. Maskin (2000) studies e¢cient auctions. In addition to these constraints, Maskin
assumes that players cannot receive funds from the seller. One important di§erence with
our work is that, unlike LL in our model, their budget constraint is not stronger than IR.
Both constraints bind in di§erent regions of the type space. The interaction between the
two constraints makes these models quite complex to analyze in general. While the optimal
mechanism can still be described as allocating the object to the player with the highest
virtual valuation, the virtual valuations of the players are jointly determined. Each of them
depends not only on the player’s type and own observable characteristics but also on the
observable characteristics of the other players. La§ont and Robert (1996) solve their model
by restricting attention to the case where the players are ex-ante symmetric. Maskin (2000)
only considers two asymmetric players. Because only LL binds in our model, we are able
to analyze the general problem of selecting up to m among n ex-ante asymmetric projects.
These authors show (like we do) that the virtual valuation functions are constant at the
top. But because in our model, the virtual quality functions of the projects are determined
separately, we can provide an interpretation for the quality thresholds and caps on virtual
quality that has no counterpart in their models. In particular, we relate each project’s qual-
ity threshold and virtual quality cap to the outside option level at which the cost and benefit
of eliciting information on the project cancel out (section III) and to the optimal value of
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selecting one among infinitely many ex-ante identical projects (Proposition 2).10
Manelli and Vincent (1995) (MV) study the problem of a firm procuring a good, when
the potential sellers have private information on the quality of their good. The buyer in
their model, as the firm in our model, has a payo§ that increases with quality and decreases
with transfers. An important di§erence is that in their model, sellers incur an opportunity
cost when selected, which increases with quality. In contrast, in our model, managers benefit
from being selected, and more so when quality is higher. Their assumption that seller utility
decreases with quality makes sense in applications where the seller finds it is more costly
to part from a higher quality good that he owns. In the applications we have in mind, the
project manager has no way to benefit from his good (the project) unless it is financed, and
conditional on being financed, the manager benefits more from working on a higher quality
project. Another important di§erence between our models is that MV use an individual
rationality constraint, while our model uses the limited liability constraint. We believe that
the limited liability constraint is appealing for some application. It might not be feasible
for a company to extract funds from an employee researcher. Note that because the benefit
function is nonnegative, the LL constraint in our model is a stronger constraint than the IR
constraint would be.
Combined, these di§erences in our models result in di§erent optimal mechanisms. In our
model, the probability of project selection is nondecreasing in project quality, while in MV
(the expected value of) the probability of project selection is nonincreasing in quality. MV
find conditions under which either a sequential o§er institution or an auction are optimal,
these are not optimal mechanisms in our setting, except when a constant mechanism is
optimal.
Finally, we note that our solution concept (using dominant strategy incentive compati-
bility) is also di§erent than MV (who use Bayesian incentive compatibility). However, it can
be shown (see proof in the online appendix) that the dominant strategy incentive compatible
optimal mechanism also solve the problem with Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints.
Thus, this di§erent approach does not contribute to the di§erences in results.
10A large literature, starting with Che and Gale (1998 and 2000) analyze auctions with budgets constraints,
where bidders hold private information on their budget, which is not the case here.
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Recently, a few papers studied the problem of choosing one of multiple projects, in the
presence of asymmetric information. In Armstrong and Vickers (2010), the principal and
the agent have di§erent preference ordering over projects, the principal delegates the project
choice to the agent, the principal can influence the agent’s behavior by specifying the set
of projects from which the agent can choose.11 In Che, Dessein and Kartik (2010) the
preferences of the principal and agent are the same, except that the agent does not value
the principal’s outside option. Projects have observed and unobserved characteristics. The
agent sends cheap talk messages, and the principal has no commitment power. They find
that the agent biases his recommendation toward better-looking projects. These papers
di§er from ours in several important ways, in particular they assume that a single agent
holds information about the set of all projects, while in our model there are multiple agents.
Additionally, their analysis does not allow transfers. In Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2013)
a firm needs to select among agents who hold private information about their value to the
decision maker and want to be selected. There are no transfers, but the firm can impose
ex post a cost on the selected agent, once his type is revealed. An important question they
address is the minimal number of agents that the firm should allow to enter the mechanism,
in order to achieve the optimal value.
There is a large literature that studies other aspects of project selection, in particular the
incidence of moral hazard issues on the selection process. Some consider moral hazard before
the selection process, when e§ort must be invested to improve the projects (Sappington,
1982). Others study moral hazard at the selection stage, when information about projects
must be acquired at a cost (Lambert, 1986; Shin, 2008). Finally, others consider moral
hazard after the selection is made, when the selected project is undertaken. Moral hazard
after the selection process distorts incentives to reveal private information on quality at the
selection stage (Antle and Eppen, 1985; Harris and Raviv, 1996; Zhang, 1997). In this paper,
we abstract from moral hazard considerations, and focus on adverse selection alone.
11Nocke and Whinston’s (2013) model is related to Armstrong and Vickers (2010), but focuses on mergers.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Private companies as well as government agencies often face the need to decide how to
allocate limited resources to projects. The information that is needed to make decisions may
be in the hands of project managers whose interests are typically not aligned with those of
the firm. Project managers have more to gain if their own project is selected.
We derived an optimal mechanism to acquire information and decide which of a given set
of projects to select. If the firm were fully informed it would always choose the highest quality
projects, but in the presence of adverse selection, when information acquisition is costly, this
is no longer true. In the optimal mechanism there is a region of reported probabilities in
which more managers than can be selected report high qualities, such that in this region
project selection is not sensitive to the project qualities. In the symmetric case, projects
in this region are randomly selected. In the asymmetric model, a constant deterministic
selection is made. Hence, the optimal mechanism involves ine¢cient project selection where
a lower quality project can be selected over a high quality one. This practice allows the firm
to save on costs of eliciting information (the incentive transfers) as it reduces the incentive
to over state project qualities.
Information asymmetry in our analysis is of an adverse selection nature. Because man-
agers compete for resources and want their own project to be selected, the firm must worry
about managers overstating the quality of their project. In contrast in a situation with moral
hazard and absent competition between managers, understating the quality of the project
might be a concern as it can help hide low e§ort. In a moral hazard model, when transfers
are used to induce e§ort, they typically reward success, while, in our setting, the firm might
reward managers that are not selected to ensure truth-telling and achieve better allocation
of resources. The optimal mechanism in our model may reward good outcomes of a manager
who reported low quality, when state dependent mechanisms are possible.
A crucial feature of our model is that the firm is facing a selection from a prequalified pool
of candidate projects. The firm is assumed to have some information about the distribution
of qualities of each of the projects, and the number of candidates is fixed. If anyone could
apply for the funds, a mechanism like we found would attract low quality candidates who
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would want to enter the competition for funds, not in hope of winning but rather with the
intention of loosing and collecting a consolation prize — the transfers that reward truthful
disclose. Facing such a pool of low expected quality candidates, not selecting any projects
might be the optimal solution. A fixed pool of prequalified project managers can arise, for
example, in a private company where project managers are prescreened employees of the
company; when application for funding requires su¢cient knowledge and there is a limited
number of candidates with the capabilities to engage in a relevant research project (as is
often the case with defense contracting); or as a final stage of a research funding process
when the firm was able to employ a two (or more) stage procedure with early stages screening
project managers whose quality comes from unfavorable distributions.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. By (7), we know that for q < Gi

qi

, ai (q
) = qi. Substitution
into (6), we find that in this range, the function V  (q) = E [qi] , and it does not depend on
q. Thus, V  (q) q is strictly decreasing in q. Similarly, by (6) and (7), for q > Gi (qi) ,
we have V  (q) = bi (qi) + q and so V  (q)  q = bi (qi) is a negative constant. For
q 2 Gi qi , Gi (qi) , from the envelope theorem, we have V 0 (q) = @V (a, q) /@q =
F (ai (q
)) < 1. The di§erence V  (q) q is decreasing in q in this interval as well. Hence,
everywhere on R this di§erence is either strictly decreasing or it equals a negative constant
which implies that V  (q) q equals 0 at most once in R.
For low values of the outside option, q < E [qi], we have V  (q)  V

qi, q
 = E [qi] > q,
i.e. the optimal threshold mechanism dominates the outside option. For high values of the
outside option, q  Gi (qi) , we have ai (q) = qi. In this case, V  (q) = bi (qi) + q <
q. Thus, for such values, the outside option mechanism dominates the optimal threshold
mechanism. By the intermediate values theorem, there is a value of the outside option in
the interval [E [qi] , Gi (qi)] for which the firm is indi§erent between the outside option and
the optimal threshold mechanism. By the previous paragraph, this value is unique in R.
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose that xi = gi = E (qi) for all qi, then in particular
for qi we have xi = min

qi + bi

qi

,E (qi)

= E (qi) . This implies that qi + bi

qi
  E (qi) ,
and thus bi

qi
  E (qi) qi. Conversely, if bi qi  E (qi) qi, then by (ai) ai (E (qi)) = qi
and V  (E (qi)) = V

qi,E (qi)

= E (qi) . Hence, gi = E (qi) , and bi

qi
  gi  qi. Therefore,
for all qi, G (qi)  G

qi

= qi + bi

qi
  gi , which implies by definition of xi that xi = gi
for all qi. Combining these results, xi = gi = E (qi) for all qi.
The following results are useful in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 3 Let the payo§ of manager i in the optimal mechanism be
Mi (q) = ti(q) + bi(q)pi(q) (A1)
The target function in (1) can be written as
Eq
"
nX
i=1
[Gi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)]
#
.
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Proof of Lemma 3. We apply the “Mirlees trick” (see Mirlees, 1974 and Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1992) to prove this lemma. The series of transformations in this proof are familiar
for this type of models, but we include them here for completeness.
Step 1. Consider first the incentive compatibility constraints (4) which we refer to as
ICi. The utility of project manager i under a mechanism in which he reports truthfully is
Mi (q) , which was defined in (A1). His utility of misreporting a type q0i equals
ti(q
0
i,qi) + bi(qi)pi(q
0
i,qi) =Mi(q
0
i,qi) + (bi(qi) bi (q0i)) pi(q0i,qi).
From the incentive compatibility constraint, we know that
Mi (q) Mi(q0i,qi) + (bi(qi) bi (q0i)) pi(q0i,qi)
i.e.
Mi (q
0
i,qi)Mi (q)  (bi(q0i) bi (qi)) pi(q0i,qi).
Using the last inequality twice (once switching the roles of qi and q0i), we get
(bi(q
0
i) bi (qi)) pi(q) Mi (q0i,qi)Mi (q)  (bi(q0i) bi (qi)) pi(q0i,qi). (A2)
Step 2. Consider now two qualities qi, q0i such that bi (qi) < bi (q
0
i) and fix qi, then
pi (qi,qi)  pi (q0i,qi) holds.12 Indeed, by (A2), we have
[bi(q
0
i) bi(qi)] [pi(q0i,qi) pi(q)]  0.
Because bi(q0i) bi(qi) > 0, this implies pi(q)  pi(q0i,qi).
Step 3. Dividing (A2) by q0i  qi and taking the limit as q0i ! qi we find that
@Mi(q)
@qi
= b0i (qi) pi(q).
12Under the assumption that b (·) is strictly increasing, one can show that ICi holds if and only if pi (·, ·)
is nondecreasing in qi and transfers satisfy the formula of Lemma 1. This result is classic for this type of
mechanism design models (e.g. see Myerson, 1981). Here, the analysis is complicated by the fact that b (·)
can be constant on a subset of its domain.
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The equality holds almost everywhere, and the right-hand side is continuous in qi almost
everywhere.13 From the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we obtain:
Mi (qi,qi) =Mi(qi,qi)
qiZ
qi
b0i(eqi)pi(eqi,qi)deqi,
substituting this into (A1) and rearranging yields the following expression.
ti(q) = 
0@bi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi) + qiZ
qi
b0i(eqi)pi(eqi,qi)deqi
1A . (A3)
Step 4. Fix qi. We use integration by parts to show that:Z qi
qi
Z qi
qi
b0i(eqi)pi(eqi,qi)deqi f(qi)dqi = Z qi
qi
b0i(qi)pi(qi,qi)Fi (qi) dqi. (A4)
Step 5. Now, we substitute the transfers (A3) into the expected value of the profit made
from agent i, conditional on qi :
Eqi [qipi(q) ti (q)]
= Eqi

qipi(q) +

bi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi) +
Z qi
qi
b0i(eqi)pi(eqi,qi)deqi
= Eqi [qipi(q) + bi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)] +
Z qi
qi
Z qi
qi
b0i(eqi)pi(eqi,qi)deqi f(qi)dqi
= Eqi [qipi(q) + bi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)] +
Z qi
qi
b0i(qi)pi(qi,qi)Fi (qi) dqi
= Eqi [Gi (qi) pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)] .
Taking the expectation over qi and adding up over i yields the desired equality.
Lemma 4 At any mechanism that satisfies the constraints, the following holds, for
each agent i 2 N .
Eqi [Gi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)]  Eqi [min {Gi (qi) , goi } pi (q)] .
13The limit of (
b(q0i)b(qi))
q0iqi pi(q
0
i,qi) exists and equals b
0 (qi) pi(q0i,qi) for almost all qi. Indeed, at any
point of the set {qi : b0 (qi) = 0} , the limit exists and equals 0, since pi (·) is bounded. As for the other
points, a corollary of Step 2 is that pi (·) is locally nondecreasing at any qi that is such that b0 (qi) > 0 and
thus is continuous almost everywhere in the set {qi : b0 (qi) > 0}.
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Proof of Lemma 4. Let q be a vector of qualities. First, by ICi we have ti (q) +
bi (qi) pi (q)  Mi(qi,qi), otherwise agent i’s type qi would have an incentive to misreport
as qi. By LLi, we have ti (q)  0, thus for all q,
bi (qi) pi (q) Mi(qi,qi) (A5)
For all qi > ai (g

i ) we have Gi (qi) > g

i , where a

i (·) is defined in (7). Therefore,(Z qi
ai (gi )
Gi(qi)pi(q)fi(qi)dqi Mi(qi,qi)
)

(Z qi
ai (gi )
gi pi(q)fi(qi)dqi
)
=
Z qi
ai (gi )
(Gi(qi) gi ) pi(q)fi(qi)dqi Mi(qi,qi)

"Z qi
ai (gi )
(Gi(qi) gi ) fi(qi)dqi  bi (qi)
#
Mi(qi,qi)
bi (qi)
= 0.
The inequality between the second and third lines is an implication of the constraint (A5).
The last equality holds by definition of the cap gi (in (9)). Therefore,Z qi
ai (gi )
Gi(qi)pi(q)fi(qi)dqi Mi(qi,qi) 
Z qi
ai (gi )
gi pi(q)fi(qi)dqi,
which further implies Z qi
qi
Gi(qi)pi(q)fi(qi)dqi Mi(qi,qi)

Z ai (gi )
qi
Gi(qi)pi(q)fi(qi)dqi +
Z qi
ai (gi )
gi pi(q)fi(qi)dqi
= Eqi [min {Gi (qi) , gi } pi (q)] .
The last equality holds because, for all qi < ai (g

i ) , we have Gi (qi) < g

i , and for all
qi > a

i (g

i ) , we have g

i > Gi (qi) .
Proof of Theorem 1. The profit of the firm at some arbitrary mechanism satisfying
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(2)-(4) equals
Eq
"
nX
i=1
[Gi(qi)pi(q)Mi(qi,qi)]
#
 Eq
"
nX
i=1
min {Gi (qi) , gi } pi (q)
#
 Eq
24Sm
0@min {G1 (q1) , g1} , ...,min {Gn (qn) , gn} , 0, ..., 0| {z }
m times
1A35
= Eq [Sm (x(q))] .
where the first expression for the profit was derived in Lemma A1, the first inequality holds
by Lemma A2, and the second holds because of the feasibility constraints (2). Under the
proposed mechanism, all the weak inequalities above hold as equalities, thus the mechanism
achieves the optimal profit. The mechanism also satisfies the constraints (2)-(4), therefore
it is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall xi = min {Gi (qi) , gi } . Note that Pr

xi  gi

= 1.
Let " > 0. We have
Pr

xi  gi 
"
m

= Pr

Gi (qi)  gi 
"
m
| gi  gi 
"
m

Pr

gi  gi 
"
m

 Pr

Gi (qi)  gi 
"
m
| gi = gi 
"
m

Pr

gi  gi 
"
m

.
The last inequality is an implication of first order stochastic domination. Both terms of
the product in the last line are positive. Therefore Pr

xi  gi  "/m

> 0. Since the
xi are iid, by the law of large numbers limn!+1 Pr

x(m) (q)  gi  "/m

= 1. Therefore
limn!+1 Pr
Sm (x (q))mgi   " = 1, as needed.
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